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How do remittances affect the choice of exchange rate regimes? Previous research shows 
that remittances, by easing the “impossible trinity”, increase the probability of governments 
adopting fixed exchange rates. However, that research overlooks the conditioning effect of 
monetary and political institutions. We argue that remittances, by altering recipient 
governments’ incentives to use monetary policy counter-cyclically, make central bank 
independence a credible anti-inflationary tool in less credible regimes; that is, autocracies. 
Thus, autocracies that receive remittances do not need to rely on fixed exchange rates. In 
this way, remittances open policy alternatives for developing autocracies. Statistical tests on 
a sample of 87 developing and transitional countries between 1980 and 2010 support our 
argument. 
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In 2016, expatriates sent back home 429 billion dollars, second only to foreign direct investment 
as a source of foreign income for developing countries (World Bank, 2017). The magnitude of 
these flows and their stability relative to other private capital inflows, justify the growing interest 
in understanding the political and economic consequences of remittances (Combes, Ebeke, & 
Maurel, 2015; World Bank, 2006). Recent research sheds light on some effects of remittances on 
domestic and global governance, in issues that range from moral hazard (Ebeke, 2012) to 
corruption (Abdih, Chami, Dagher, & Montiel, 2012; Tyburski, 2012, 2014), foreign aid policy 
choices (Bermeo & Leblang, 2015), and foreign direct investment (Leblang, 2010). However, we 
know less about the effect of remittances on the choice of exchange rate regimes. 
A significant body of literature analyses how financial internationalisation and capital 
movements may constrain domestic policy options (Dion, 2009; Garrett & Lange, 1991; Rudra, 
2002). In contrast, this paper shows ways in which remittances may make certain policy options 
available in institutional contexts often encountered in developing countries. In particular, we 
study the effect of remittances on the choice of exchange rate regimes, a policy with profound 
repercussions both on countries’ domestic economies and their foreign economic relations 
(Frieden, 1991, 2015). Although remittances do not accrue to governments directly, they have the 
potential to alter incumbents’ incentives to adopt different economic policies. In this paper, we 
argue that remittances allow governments to adopt less costly, more flexible exchange rate 
arrangements, while credibly committing to controlling inflation. This effect, however, depends 
on the country’s monetary and political institutions, as already suggested by Bernhard et al. (2002) 
and others.  
There are two ways through which remittances can affect exchange rate regimes. First, the 
stability and anti-cyclicality of remittances can mitigate the costs of adopting fixed exchange rates. 
Thus, remittances should increase the probability of observing fixed exchange rates, as suggested 
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in Singer (2010). In this author’s account, the effect is not mediated by political regime or other 
monetary institutions. In contrast, we focus on the conditioning effects of political and monetary 
institutions, and propose that under some circumstances, the stability and anti-cyclicality of 
remittances should enhance the credibility of central bank independence (CBI) as an anti-
inflationary tool, and reduce the need to rely on fixed exchange rates. We argue that this effect is 
especially relevant in autocracies, where the credibility of CBI is more easily compromised (Broz, 
2002). Thus, the scope conditions of this credibility effect are both the existence of an independent 
central bank and less transparent regimes (autocracies). We find that in autocracies with 
independent central banks, remittances are associated with a greater likelihood of observing 
flexible exchange rate regimes.  
This paper bridges two literatures. On one hand, studies on the impact of international 
migration show that remittances have significant effects on national economies, with 
consequences for a wide range of development outcomes (Abdih et al., 2012; Ahmed, 2012; 
Combes & Ebeke, 2011; Escribà-Folch, Meseguer, & Wright, 2015). On the other hand, research 
on the choice of exchange rate regimes and monetary institutions under capital mobility indicates 
that the choice of monetary and exchange rate arrangements cannot be thought of as 
independent of each other (Bearce, 2002, 2008; Bernhard et al., 2002; Bodea, 2010). Only a few 
studies have sought to connect these two literatures (Mandelman, 2013; Singer, 2010). However, 
these studies do not discuss the interactions between exchange rate regimes and CBI in the 
presence of remittances, nor do these works discuss the potential diverging effects in different 
types of political regimes (Bearce, 2014; Leblang, 2003; Steinberg & Malhotra, 2014). Accounting 
for these interactions provides a better understanding of the scope conditions that shape the 
effect of remittances on the choice of exchange rate regime in developing countries. 
We contribute to a growing literature showing that although remittances bypass 
incumbents, they have profound implications for home countries in policies as diverse as social 
spending (Doyle, 2015; Easton & Montinola, 2017 ), diaspora engagement (Leblang, 2017), and 
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debt sustainability (Chami et al., 2008). We also contribute to new research showing that country 
institutional characteristics may affect the constraining effects of the “impossible trinity” 
(Barajas, Chami, Ebeke, & Oeking, 2016; Rey, 2015, 2016).1  
The paper proceeds as follows. The following section provides the background on the 
choice of monetary institutions. Next, we review the role of remittances in affecting the 
credibility of different monetary instruments. Following this discussion, we derive our main 
testable hypothesis. We then present the data and methods, and discuss our findings. We finish 
with a conclusion and propose further steps for research. 
The Political Economy of Exchange Rate Regimes 
The “impossible trinity” posits that governments can simultaneously achieve only two out of 
three desirable policy outcomes: high capital mobility, stable exchange rates, and an autonomous 
monetary policy (Fleming, 1962; Mundell, 1961). In the post–Bretton Woods era, characterised 
by the removal of capital controls, the trilemma is reduced to the choice between enjoying 
exchange rate stability or an autonomous monetary policy (Obstfeld, Shambaugh, & Taylor, 
2005; Rey, 2015). We should observe floating exchange rates in countries that prefer the ability 
to respond to recessions or economic shocks. In contrast, countries that prioritize the stability of 
their foreign economic relations, or that need to signal commitment to price stability, could be 
expected to choose fixed exchange rates – and forfeit monetary autonomy. 
We focus on one of these important roles that fixed exchange rate regimes play, 
especially relevant for developing countries: backing anti-inflationary or orthodox monetary 
commitments. To control inflation – and to signal commitment to this policy goal – countries 
                                                 
1 We are able to examine empirically the effect of regime type in this context thanks to newly released 
data on legal central bank independence. These data allow our study to include a significant 
number of autocracies excluded from previous analyses (Garriga, 2016). 
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can either fix their exchange rate or increase CBI.2 CBI is less costly than fixed exchange rates 
because it does not imply giving up monetary policy for stabilisation purposes (Obstfeld & 
Rogoff, 1995, p.74). However, a government’s commitment to respecting CBI is also less 
transparent: it is harder to learn whether the government imposes its preferences over the central 
bank board than to observe deviations from a fixed exchange rate (Broz, 2002). This reduced 
ability to observe compliance may affect the credibility of the commitment. Here, regime type 
matters. Democracies can rely on the regime’s credibility and commit to price stability through 
institutional mechanisms. Autocracies cannot credibly commit to respecting CBI (Broz, 2002). 
Therefore, they should rely on a costlier commitment technology to control inflation, namely, 
fixed exchange rates. 3 
We argue that remittances may enable autocracies to use CBI to signal their commitment 
to price stability. Holding constant other incentives to adopt different exchange rate regimes, we 
argue that remittances alter the incentives to adopt a fixed exchange rate in the presence of an 
independent central bank.4 
                                                 
2 Fixed exchange rates and independent central banks are institutional mechanisms that provide 
credibility to price stability commitments. For a careful discussion of the limits of these 
mechanisms, and the possible need to rely on both of them, or the limits, see Bodea (2010).  
3 Note that credible central bank independence is considered to have other functions similar to fixed 
exchange rates. In non-OECD countries, central bank independence may attract foreign direct 
investment, and guarantee better conditions in credit markets (Bodea & Hicks, 2015a).  
4 A significant body of literature explains the distributive pressures to enact fixed exchange rates 
(Frieden, 2015). In particular, domestic sectors that profit from international trade or payments – 
such as exporters – support fixed exchange rates (Frieden, 1991). However, the cost of 
sustaining fixed exchange rates is high for governments, who lose the ability to respond to 
economic downturns, and for consumers, who are generally domestically oriented (Bearce & 
Tuxhorn, 2017). We control for sectoral pressures in our empirical analysis. Future research 




Remittances, Central Bank Independence, and Exchange Rates 
Remittances are a more stable source of foreign revenue than other capital flows, such as private 
portfolio investment. Furthermore, remittances are sent counter-cyclically, increasing during 
adverse economic conditions, natural catastrophes, and during war and conflict in home 
countries (Frankel, 2011; World Bank, 2006; Yang & Choi, 2007). Thus, remittances have an 
income smoothing effect that performs an insurance role, helping families to weather adverse 
economic times (Combes & Ebeke, 2011). Through remittances, migrants often become non-
state providers of public goods at the local level (Adida & Girod, 2011; Aparicio & Meseguer, 
2012; Duquette-Rury, 2014), easing demands on governments to provide public and social 
goods. 
Numerous studies across different regions provide evidence of a substitution effect by 
which households invest substantial amounts of the money they receive from relatives abroad on 
education and health, as well as on other investments such as housing or starting private 
businesses (Adams & Cuecuecha, 2010; Ebeke & Drabo, 2011). Through a variety of channels, 
remittances reduce poverty (Adams & Page, 2005; Fajnzylber & López, 2008; World Bank, 
2006), making it less pressing overall for governments to invest in social policies as recipients’ 
autonomy from the state increases (McMann, 2006). Ahmed (2012, 2013) and Easton & 
Montinola (2017) document that as a result of the substitution effect of remittances, autocracies 
that receive remittances spend less on social transfers and more on patronage and military 
spending.5 Doyle (2015) shows that Latin American governments have reduced social spending 
as a result of remittances, partly due to the change in preferences for redistribution among 
remittance recipients, away from higher taxation. Also, while remittances are rarely directly taxed, 
                                                 
5 Easton & Montinola (2017) find that in democracies, remittances complement rather than substitute 
for government spending.  
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they increase household consumption and provide an extra source of revenue for governments 
via indirect taxation (Chami et al., 2008; Ebeke, 2014).6 Bugamelli & Paterno (2009) show that 
remittances above 3–4% of GDP contribute to financial stability by lowering the probability of 
current account reversals. This is because the stable and low-cyclical character of remittances can 
enhance countries’ credibility in international markets in terms of debt sustainability. Remittances 
also improve countries’ credit ratings (Avendano, Gaillard, & Nieto-Parra, 2011; Chami et al., 
2008:72; Ncube & Brixiova, 2013; World Bank 2006). Through all these channels, remittances 
improve the overall economic outlook of the countries that receive them, and make it less 
pressing for governments to intervene in the event of economic slowdown. Unsurprisingly, 
many governments in outmigration countries reach out to their diasporas to entice those abroad 
to invest in their communities of origin through co-production schemes as a way to expand their 
budgets (Aparicio & Meseguer 2012; Duquette-Rury 2014).7  
                                                 
6 Public financing of chronic fiscal deficits is generally considered a major cause of inflation in 
developing countries. It could then be argued that the relevant mechanism by which remittances 
may enhance the credibility of these countries is by making that financing less pressing. 
However, remittances being private funds, it is not simple to anticipate their consequences on 
fiscal consolidation: remittances indirectly affect government expenditures and revenues 
depending on households’ decisions to save or spend, and remitters’ spending on welfare and 
public goods, which can complement or substitute for public spending (Gnangnon, 2014, pp. 
171-172). We gave a number of examples above showing that remittances seem to substitute for 
government spending in welfare policies.  Gnangnon shows that in a group of the top 30 
remittance-dependent countries, remittances are associated with a greater probability of fiscal 
consolidation. The author does not account for regime type.  
7 There are of course other cases of more intrusive meddling with international remittances. For 
instance, Lim & Morshed (2017, p. 148) provide the examples of (now abolished) Documentary 
Stamp Tax of 0.3 pesos for every 200 pesos in Philippines. Cuba levied a 10% tax on all 
remittance in US dollars through the exchange rate; India unsuccessfully proposed a tax of 
12.36% on fees remitters pay to send money home. On the whole, taxing remittances directly is 




Based on this compensatory logic of remittances, Singer argues that because remittances 
“mitigate the costs of forgone domestic monetary policy autonomy,” they should increase the 
likelihood that policy makers adopt fixed exchange rates (Singer, 2010, p. 307). In other words, 
in a context of capital mobility, remittances help ease the trilemma by decreasing the need for an 
autonomous monetary policy. Singer finds that remittances (unconditionally) increase the 
likelihood of having fixed exchange rates in developing countries.  
This account, however, is not clear regarding why all governments would prefer to tie 
their hands with a fixed exchange rate.8 First, if a government needs to signal their anti-
inflationary commitment – a frequent concern in developing countries – CBI is a less costly 
mechanism that can deliver similar results. Secondly, assuming that all governments prefer fixed 
exchange rates is at odds with the fact that fixed exchange rates are especially onerous for 
countries with high exposure to volatile capital flows, or highly dependent on them (Fernandez, 
Karacadag, & Duttagupta, 2004; Rogoff, Husain, Mody, Brooks, & Oomes, 2004). When 
remittances represent an important source of foreign revenue, incumbents may want the 
flexibility to adjust their monetary policy in the event of adverse economic shocks in the host 
economies, something that fixed exchange rates preclude. Finally, in contrast with Broz (2002), 
such an unconditional account of the choice of exchange rate regimes implies that all political 
regimes are in the same position when it comes to choosing between monetary and exchange 
rate commitments.  
These arguments point out powerful reasons to adopt flexible exchange rate regimes in 
developing countries, and to commit to price stability through less costly tools, such as CBI. Yet 
for countries with inflation concerns, flexible exchange rates are an option only if monetary 
commitments are credible. Because remittances are relatively stable and counter-cyclical, 
                                                 
8 For instance, electoral incentives should make democracies more likely to prefer floating exchange 
rates (Bearce & Hallerberg, 2011; Frieden, 1991; Steinberg & Malhotra, 2014) 
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remittances can make the commitment to central bank independence more credible through the 
same compensatory logic we laid out above. 
We further contend that this effect is especially important for political regimes suffering 
from a credibility deficit (Broz, 2002).9 Generally speaking, commitments to CBI in democracies 
are credible because of the transparency of democratic institutions and decision-making 
processes (Broz, 2002). In contrast, commitments made by autocracies are more vulnerable to 
changes in the autocrats’ wills. Because of their countercyclical character, remittances may alter 
the autocrats’ incentives to pressure independent central bankers.10 If, as we contend, 
remittances allow autocrats to choose between CBI and fixed exchange rate regimes, we should 
observe a substitution effect between independent central banks and pegs because CBI is a less 
costly commitment technology.  
It is important to emphasise that autocracies with independent central banks are not rare. 
On a worldwide sample between 1970 and 2012, about 40% of observations in non-democratic 
regimes (Polity2 <7), and 49% in democracies have independent central banks (Garriga, 2016).11 
To illustrate, consider the cases of Armenia and Mexico. These countries are highly dependent 
on remittances, both in absolute and in relative numbers, have flexible exchange rate 
arrangements, and independent central banks (Banaian, Kemme, & Sargsyan, 2008; Ruiz & 
Vargas-Silva, 2010, p. 174). When they adopted floating exchange rate regimes, both countries 
were autocracies that had granted independence to their central banks. Studies that explore the 
                                                 
9 We assume that all autocracies have credibility problems because their lack of transparency hampers 
the credibility of their monetary commitments (Broz, 2002). Some democratic countries may 
also have credibility problems due to other reasons, but analysing variance of credibility among 
democracies is outside the scope of this paper.  
10 This expectation is consistent with research showing that central banks also have significant effects 
in autocratic regimes (Baerg, Gray, & Willisch, 2017; Bodea, Garriga, & Higashijima, 2019). 




adoption of inflation targeting in these countries point out the important role that remittances 
play in dealing with balance-of-payments imbalances (Ruiz & Vargas-Silva, 2010; Van Aarle & 
Sosoian, 2010). Furthermore, anecdotal evidence shows that their central banks were well aware 
of the importance of remittances (Ruiz & Vargas-Silva, 2010). 
Note that our argument does not imply any prior assumption about the temporal 
sequence in the choice of monetary instruments. We claim that we are likely simultaneously to observe 
remittances and flexible exchange rate regimes in autocracies, but only in the presence of an independent central 
bank. We take the temporal precedence of CBI and exchange rate regime as an empirical matter. 
Nor does our argument imply any assumption about the relationship between receiving 
remittances and the probability of granting more independence to the central bank.12 We merely 
contend that receiving remittances makes independent central banks more credible in their price 
stability commitment via reduced pressure for social and public spending and through a better 
appraisal of a country’s ability to meet international commitments.13 
In sum, we contend that in previous research, the mediating role of political regimes and 
CBI has not been fully spelled out. We argue that the same compensatory character of 
remittances makes CBI credible, and that this effect is relevant in autocracies. As a result, we 
expect autocracies that receive remittances and grant independence to their central banks to have 
                                                 
12 In fact, we do not find any robust evidence in that regard. To address this question, we use the 
model specification of Bodea & Hicks (2015a) for central bank reform, and test the existence of 
a relationship between remittances – measured in different ways – and level of central bank 
independence. We do not find significant relationships between past levels of remittances and 
central bank independence in the global sample, or in subsamples of democracies and 
autocracies. 
13 Note that in autocracies, remittances may support the adoption of flexible exchange rates beyond 
strengthening the credibility of independent central banks as a price stability commitment. Like 
independent central banks, remittances also facilitate access to international capital markets 
(Bodea & Hicks, 2015a). Thus remittances, by improving the credibility of countries to honour 
their debt commitments, make independent central banks credible anti-inflationary tools.  
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flexible exchange rate regimes without compromising their commitment to low inflation. This 
effect of remittances should not be observed in autocracies that do not grant independence to 
their central banks. Further, given that democracies can rely on their institutions’ transparency to 
substitute fixed exchange rate regimes for independent central banks (Bodea & Hicks, 2015b; 
Broz, 2002; Clark, 2002), the mechanism of enhanced CBI credibility through remittances should 
not matter in democracies.  
From the discussion above, we derive the following testable hypothesis: In autocracies with 
independent central banks, remittances increase the probability of observing floating exchange rates. 
Data and Models 
We test our argument on a sample of developing countries between 1981 and 2010. The sample 
size is restricted by data availability. The dependent variable is the de facto exchange rate regime. 
Following the literature on exchange rate regimes (e.g., Bearce & Hallerberg, 2011; Frieden, 
2015; Singer, 2010; Steinberg & Malhotra, 2014), we use Reinhart and Rogoff’s (2004) updated 
data. Exchange rate regime is a categorical variable ranging from 1 (fixed) to 4 (floating). 48 
percent of the observations in our sample are coded as fixed exchange rates (1); 27 percent as 
crawling pegs or bands (2). Managed floats (3), and free-floating regimes (4) represent 21 and 4 
percent of our sample respectively. The use of the four-category variable allows us to account for 
different degrees of “hardness of the peg” (Meissner & Oomes, 2009).14 Further, this four-
category variable also allows us to address the fact that many developing countries have opted 
                                                 
14 Following other studies on exchange rate regimes (Chiu & Willett, 2009; Simmons & Hainmueller, 
2005; Singer, 2010; Steinberg & Malhotra, 2014), we exclude observations classified as freely 
falling and dual market in which parallel data is missing (categories 5 and 6 in Reinhart & 
Rogoff’s (2004) coarse classification). These two cases are considered as distinct from the 
floating–pegging continuum (Meissner & Oomes, 2009). This decision excludes 102 
observations from our analyses.  
12 
 
for what Aizenman (2018: 1) describes as mixed regimes or a “trilemma middle ground” 
described by a combination of “managed exchange rate flexibility, controlled financial 
integration, and viable but limited monetary independence.”15 Figure A1 in the Supplementary 
Appendix shows the distribution of exchange rate regimes in our sample by regime type. 
We measure remittances as the country’s yearly inflows in constant dollars, logged and 
lagged. The data comes from the World Development Indicators (WDI) of the World Bank 
(2015). We prefer this measure to the frequently used remittances as percentage of the country’s 
GDP because remittances impact the recipient country’s growth (Escribà-Folch et al., 2015) – 
this may in turn affect the interpretation of our results, underestimating the actual impact of 
remittances. Nonetheless, we use alternative measures of remittances (both remittances as a 
percentage of GDP, and remittances in constant dollars per capita) as robustness checks 
(Supplementary Appendix, Table A3).  
We use Garriga’s (2016) measure of CBI, based on Cukierman, Webb, and Neyapti 
(1992). The index ranges from 0 (lowest) to 1 (highest independence), and weighs legal 
characteristics of the central bank’s governor (appointment, dismissal, and term of office); policy 
formulation attributions (who formulates and has the final decision on monetary policy, and the 
role of the central bank in the budget process); the central bank’s objectives; and the central 
bank’s limitations on lending to the public sector (Garriga, 2016, p. 854). 
As mentioned, autocracies do grant legal independence to their central banks, and there 
is a significant variance in CBI across autocracies. Although it is beyond the scope of this article 
                                                 
15 These regimes became prevalent following successive financial crisis in emerging markets and 
more recently in the U.S. and the Eurozone area. This period has witnessed a progressive shift in 
views regarding the viability and pertinence of capital controls as well as the use of 
precautionary measures (such as the accumulation of international reserves) to tackle financial 
instability – transforming the trilemma into a quadrilemma once financial stability is also added 
to the picture (Ainzenman, 2018).  
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to analyse this in detail, there are various reasons that could explain central bank independence in 
autocracies. Boylan (1998, 2001) sees central bank independence under Pinochet’s rule as a way 
to tie the hands of future administrations. Other explanations include signalling creditworthiness 
to international markets (Maxfield, 1997), attempts to deflect responsibility for poor economic 
outcomes (Bodea et al., 2019), learning and competition (Bodea & Hicks, 2015a), norm diffusion 
(Johnson, 2016; McNamara, 2002), or power-sharing agreements (Baerg et al., 2017; Bodea et al., 
2019). Figure 1 shows the distribution of CBI among democracies and autocracies in our sample. 
Democracy is defined as Polity2 ≥ 6 (Marshall & Jaggers, 2012). The mean CBI for democracies 
is .54, and .48 for autocracies. There are 951 observations of authoritarian regimes with 
independent central banks (CBI ≥ .5). 
 
 







Our theory contends that the impact of remittances on the choice of exchange rate 
regime is conditional on the political regime and on monetary institutions. Testing this 
hypothesis entails using a triple interaction. For ease of interpretation, we include an interactive 
term between remittances and CBI, and explore the effect of this interaction in subsamples of 
autocracies and democracies as defined above. 
We control for other variables typically included in models of exchange rate regime 
choices. Following Singer’s (2010) specification, our models include the lagged dependent 
variable, the natural log of GDP and GDP per capita, exports as percentage of GDP, reserves in 
months of imports, trade volatility (the standard deviation on t, t–1 and t–2 on net barter terms of 
trade), inflation (logged), and current account balance. We include the size of manufacturing 
relative to the GDP as a control for sectoral explanations of exchange rate regime choices. Since 
population also influences the volume of remittances received, we control for the country’s 
population (logged and lagged). These data come from WDI (World Bank, 2015). We also 
control for capital account openness (Chinn & Ito, 2008) to account for the fact that 
governments still use this policy tool and for regime type using Polity2 (Marshall & Jaggers, 
2012). Lagged variables are indicated in the tables. 
We run ordered probit models, clustered on country, on a sample of 87 developing 
countries between 1981 and 2010.16 Given the panel structure of the data, where subscripts i and 
t represent country and year respectively, and that the dependent variable is categorical (the 
outcomes are represented by o, and the cutpoints by k), our baseline specification is:  
Pr(ERRo =j)it = Pr(kj-1 < β1 ln(remittit-1) + β2 CBI it-1 + β3 [ln(remittit-1)* CBI it-1 ] + γ1 X it-1 + εit  ≤ kj) it
 (1) 
                                                 




Recall that the dependent variable is categorical, with greater values indicating a more 
flexible exchange rate regime. In autocracies, we expect β1<0, as this is the effect of remittances on 
the probability of having more flexible exchange rate regimes when CBI is zero (Singer, 2010). 
We expect β2<0 because in the absence of remittances, CBI is not a credible substitute for fixed 
exchange rates in autocracies (Broz, 2002). However, we expect β3>0, indicating that the effect 
of remittances on the probability of having a flexible exchange rate regimes increases as CBI 
increases.  
Results 
Table 1 presents the test of our argument. Column 1 shows the results of the baseline model on 
a sample that pools autocracies and democracies. In the full sample, the combined coefficient 
(marginal effect of remittances) is positive and marginally statistically significant, indicating that 
remittances increase the likelihood of countries adopting more flexible exchange rates.17 This 
weak result is not surprising, given the expected diverging effects of these variables in different 
institutional contexts and the greater number of country/year observations under autocracy. 




                                                 
17 However, as we show in models on sub-samples of autocracies and democracies, the result in the 
pooled sample seems to be driven by autocracies.  
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Table 1. Ordered probit estimations of de facto exchange rate (four-category dependent variable) 
Model and  (1) (2) (3) 
Sample All developing countries Autocracies Democracies 
Remittances (in constant US$, log) t-1 -0.0663 -0.164** 0.0247 
 (0.0666) (0.0750) (0.0853) 
Central Bank Independence(CBI) t-1 -3.401* -7.254*** 0.293 
 (1.950) (2.241) (2.361) 
Remittances (in constant US$, log) t-1 0.177 0.425*** -0.0498 
           *CBI t-1 (0.118) (0.139) (0.153) 
Dependent variablet-1 2.802*** 2.630*** 3.140*** 
 (0.231) (0.289) (0.379) 
GDP (log)  0.380 -0.376 -8.959 
 (0.675) (0.700) (9.030) 
GDP per capita (log)  -0.363 0.320 9.065 
 (0.680) (0.719) (8.998) 
Exports t-1  -0.00337 -0.00241 -0.00169 
 (0.00289) (0.00290) (0.00578) 
Reserves in months of imports  -0.00291 -0.0111 -0.0205 
 (0.0126) (0.0229) (0.0187) 
Trade volatility  0.00332 0.00199 0.0168 
 (0.00599) (0.00683) (0.0117) 
Inflation t-1  0.0360 -0.00153 0.0893 
 (0.125) (0.159) (0.180) 
Current account balance  -0.000754 -0.00554 0.0302 
 (0.00809) (0.00776) (0.0227) 
Capital account openness 0.0344 0.0637 -0.00415 
 (0.0341) (0.0426) (0.0673) 
Polity2 0.0187***   
 (0.00708)   
Share of manufacturing t-1 0.00739 0.00900 -0.00307 
 (0.00887) (0.0108) (0.0139) 
Population (log) t-1 -0.344 0.381 9.039 
 (0.683) (0.720) (9.030) 
Constant cut1 3.700*** 0.771 6.800*** 
 (1.302) (1.567) (1.924) 
Constant cut2 6.750*** 3.695** 10.14*** 
 (1.346) (1.581) (2.038) 
Constant cut3 9.974*** 6.594*** 13.94*** 
 (1.437) (1.610) (2.269) 
β remit + β remit x CBI 0.110* 0.261*** -0.025 
 (0.061) (0.077) (0.083) 
Observations 1,313 815 498 
Countries 87 68 44 
Pseudo R2 0.702 0.669 0.741 
Chi2 210.3 154 133.1 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Statistical significance 




In autocracies (column 2), the interaction term reveals that autocracies that receive 
remittances are more likely to have flexible exchange rates as CBI increases (β3>0). The 
combined coefficient (β1 + β3>0), which measures the marginal effect of remittances on the 
likelihood of having a floating exchange rate regime, and which appears at the bottom of Table 
1, is equally positive and significant. The results for democracies are the exact opposite in sign, 
albeit not statistically significant, which is consistent with our expectations.  
Figure 2, based on column 2, provides support for our main hypothesis. Making CBI our 
conditioning variable, the marginal effect of remittances on the probability of observing a 
managed float (dotted line) is positive and statistically significant when the central bank is 
independent; that is, when CBI ≥ 0.5 (the common threshold for classifying central banks as 
independent).18 Conversely, the marginal effect of remittances on the probability of observing a 
fixed exchange rate is negative at similar levels of CBI, indicating a relationship between 
remittances and the substitution between fixed exchange rates and CBI. These effects are 
significantly different from each other when CBI ≥ 0.5, which corresponds to about 65% of 
autocracies and about 56% of autocracy-year observations in our sample of autocracies.  
 
  
                                                 
18 We plot the effect on the probability of observing managed floats instead of free floating because 
there are very few observations in this category. Figure A2 in the appendix shows the marginal 
effect for each category of exchange rate regime.  
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Figure 2. Marginal effect of remittances on the probability of observing a fixed exchange rate 





Our results do not support the alternative argument that by reducing the costs of 
adopting a fixed exchange rate, remittances increase the probability of pegging regardless of 
other monetary institutions in place (Singer 2010). As Figure 2 shows, in autocracies, once CBI is 
accounted for, the marginal effect of remittances on the probability of observing a peg – dark-
grey line – is positive at very low levels of central bank independence (CBI < .33); but this effect 





We run the following tests on the autocracies sub-sample. Consistent with the literature on exchange 
rate regimes, we did not include country fixed effects in the main models because about one 
third of the observations drop out when we do so.19 To control for unobserved sources of 
heterogeneity, we include regional fixed effects (see Model 4, Table 3). Even after losing 
observations belonging to one region, results hold. 
 
 
                                                 
19 Using fixed effects is highly problematic because it removes from the estimations many countries 
with little variation in exchange rate regimes (Steinberg & Malhotra, 2014). When we include 
country fixed effects in our probit estimation, the signs remain the same but the coefficients lose 




Table 2. Robustness checks. Autocracies only 
Model (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Region FE Jackknife Time 5 Yr Lags GMM IVProbit 
Remittances (in US$, log)t-1 -0.133* -0.164* -0.0842 -0.117 -0.0695*  
 (0.0751) (0.0904) (0.122) (0.0985) (0.0408)  
Remittances/GDPt-1      -0.344** 
      (0.148) 
Central Bank Independence t-1 -7.814*** -7.254*** -8.519** -6.039** -2.571** -2.659** 
 (2.444) (2.678) (3.682) (3.024) (0.991) (1.079) 
Remittancest-1 *CBIt-1 0.465*** 0.425** 0.446* 0.344* 0.179** 0.647*** 
 (0.146) (0.167) (0.229) (0.192) (0.0707) (0.241) 
Dependent variablet-1 2.498*** 2.630***  2.512*** 0.788*** 3.371*** 
 (0.347) (0.347)  (0.330) (0.0541) (0.353) 
GDP(log) -1.235 -0.376 -4.085** -1.074 0.591 0.439 
 (0.901) (0.945) (1.798) (0.995) (0.991) (2.395) 
GDP per capita (log) 1.331 0.320 3.941** 1.078 -0.615 -0.304 
 (0.937) (0.964) (1.828) (1.018) (0.996) (2.384) 
Exportst-1 -0.00724* -0.00241 0.00209 -0.00274 0.000608 0.00285 
 (0.00426) (0.00363) (0.00595) (0.00344) (0.00198) (0.00452) 
Reserves mo. of imports -0.00333 -0.0111 -0.00980 -0.0181 -0.00138 -0.0224 
 (0.0290) (0.0286) (0.0310) (0.0253) (0.0138) (0.0450) 
Trade volatility -0.00290 0.00199 0.00109 0.00362 -0.00304 0.0113 
 (0.00721) (0.00838) (0.00966) (0.00879) (0.00379) (0.00867) 
Inflation (log) t-1 0.122 -0.00153 0.835*** 0.124 -0.0697 0.0235 
 (0.190) (0.173) (0.250) (0.179) (0.0978) (0.211) 
Current account balance -0.00312 -0.00554 -0.00669 -0.00959 0.000296 0.00373 
 (0.00750) (0.00909) (0.00929) (0.00884) (0.00219) (0.0172) 
Capital account openness 0.0517 0.0637 0.0321 0.0768 0.0324 -0.205** 
 (0.0522) (0.0503) (0.0787) (0.0555) (0.0223) (0.0809) 
Share of manufacturing t-1 -0.00748 0.00900 -0.0154 0.0136 0.00642 0.0221 
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Model (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 Region FE Jackknife Time 5 Yr Lags GMM IVProbit 
 (0.0151) (0.0141) (0.0189) (0.0134) (0.00692) (0.0163) 
Population (log)t-1 1.217 0.381 4.095** 1.061 -0.634 -0.329 
 (0.938) (0.964) (1.818) (1.016) (0.987) (2.413) 
βremit + βremit x CBI .331*** .261*** 0.362*** 0.227** .109*** .303*** 
 (.091) (.092) (0.130) (0.105) (0.033) (0.113) 
Observations 624 815 824 666 815 815 
Countries 54 68 69 63 68 68 
Pseudo R2 0.655 0.669  0.646   
Arellano-Bond test for AR in first 
differences (z value) 
      
     AR(1) 
    AR (2) 
    -2.70*** 
0.71 
 
Test of overriding 
restrictions:chi2(61) 
      Sargan  
      Hansen 





Wald Test of Exogeneity (p value)      0. 6763 
Note: Robust standard errors clustered on country in parentheses. Robust standard errors in Column 8 are not clustered, constant omitted. Statistical 
significance indicated as *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. In column 4, regional effects are included but not reported. In Column 7, the interaction is 




A second concern is the sensitivity of our results to outlier cases. We run both 
jackknife estimations (Model 5) and a cross-validation test on the sample of autocracies. 
We did not find any case driving the main finding.20 In Model 6, we present the results 
excluding the lagged dependent variable and including instead cubic time polynomials to 
control for time dependence. This modification does not change our results substantively. 
A series of concerns relate to endogeneity problems. Exchange rate regimes may 
affect the patterns of remittance-sending – in other words, exchange rates are likely to 
determine remittances by affecting migrants’ decisions to remit – creating a problem of 
reverse causality (Panda & Trivedi, 2015; Vargas-Silva, 2009). It is also possible that 
measurement error in the remittances variable causes biases in our estimations, or that we 
are not capturing some omitted variable that is influencing both remittances and the choice 
of exchange rates. To address these issues, we employ several strategies. First, we lag 
remittances by 5 years (Model 7). Second, we run generalized methods of moments 
(GMM) dynamic panel data models (Arellano & Bond, 1991; Arellano & Bover, 1995; 
Blundell & Bond, 1998).21  In spite of its challenges, this strategy tackles the issues of joint 
                                                 
20 Cross-validation is a leave-one-out method that helps to detect countries that do not fit the 
model. First, the model is estimated leaving one country out of the sample; second, the 
estimated parameters are taken to predict the data of the country that has not been used, 
and the mean absolute error is calculated for that country; third, the individual value is 
compared with the mean absolute error of the sample. We do not find any case in which 
the difference in absolute terms between the individual and the mean absolute error is 
problematic.  
21 Arellano-Bond type models are problematic because the number of instruments can become 
too large for the sample size (Roodman, 2009). We use short lags to overcome these 
issues.  
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endogeneity of all explanatory variables in a dynamic formulation (Model 8).22 Our main 
findings hold. 
Additionally, we use an instrumental variable approach. We instrument remittances 
with the GDP per capita in the top ten rich migration destination countries of the world, 
weighted by the inverse of the distance of each developing nation to the top ten destination 
countries. Formally, the instrumental variable Zi,t for developing country i in year t can be 
written as:  




𝑗=1  (2) 
where distanceij refers to the distance between country i and destination country j, and 
GDP per capitajt measures real per capita GDP in destination country j at time t. 
The ten largest host countries for migrants in 1990 were the United States, Russia, 
Germany, France, Saudi Arabia, Canada, Australia, United Kingdom, Israel, and Kuwait 
(UN Population Division, Department of Economic and Social Affairs).23 Distance comes 
from the GeoDist database.24 Finally, annual income per capita data comes from the WDI 
(World Bank, 2015). This variable performs well in predicting remittances as percent of 
GDP, but is a poor instrument for predicting remittances in constant USD, which is the 
variable we have used in the main models. Nonetheless, since our results are robust to 
different specifications of the dependent variable (see Table A3, Supplementary Appendix), 
                                                 
22 Both Sargan and Hansen tests of overriding restrictions fail to reject the null hypothesis (H0: 
overidentifying restrictions are valid). Similarly, the difference-in-Hansen tests of 






we consider this test informative for addressing the robustness of our results. In the sample 
of autocracies, remittances over GDP and the instrument are strongly correlated (0.60).  
Model 9 shows the results of the second stage IV probit estimation  – after 
dichotomizing the dependent variable, so that categories 1 and 2 are coded 0 (fixed 
exchange rates) and categories 3 and 4 are coded 1 (flexible exchange rates), confirming the 
results in the main models: remittances increase the likelihood of observing a fixed 
exchange rate at low levels of central bank independence, but as CBI increases the 
probability of observing a fixed exchange rate decreases in favour of more flexible 
exchange rate arrangements. Note, however, that the Wald Test of exogeneity suggests that 
the pooled probit estimation is preferred.  
In the Supplementary Appendix, we show further robustness tests. First, our results 
hold when we replicate Table 1 using different measures of our dependent and main 
independent variable (remittances). In Table A3, we measure remittances as a ratio of GDP 
and in per capita terms . In both cases, our main result holds. The results also hold when 
we dichotomize the dependent variable into fixed and flexible exchange rates as explained 
above. This reduces concerns about the effect that movements within the main categories 
could have on our results – that is, that our theory mainly applies to marginal changes 
between fixed exchange rates and crawling pegs, or between managed floats and free-
floating regimes. These results are reported in Table A4.  
 
Conclusions 
We address one consequence of globalization on domestic politics: the effect of growing 
capital movements associated with international migration. We focus on developing 
countries, and analyse how remittances affect the choice of exchange rate regimes. We 
theorize and find that the relationship between remittances and exchange rate regime 
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choices is highly dependent on the political and monetary institutions in the recipient 
countries. In fact, we propose that different channels may link remittances and exchange 
rate regimes depending on domestic institutions. We show that within the constraints 
imposed by the trilemma, remittances open up policy options for less democratic countries 
in the developing world. 
In our view, political and monetary institutions need to be explicitly considered to 
understand why some governments have no choice but to adopt fixed exchange rates, 
while others have more freedom to choose exchange rates. We look at two crucial 
conditioning variables: political regimes and central bank independence. More concretely, 
we argue and show that remittances have different effects on exchange rate regime choices, 
depending on how credible monetary commitments are. Holding other things constant, 
remittances can make delegation to central banks credible in less-transparent regimes 
because they curb the incentives to use monetary policy counter-cyclically, enhancing 
autocracies’ capacity to honour price stability commitments. In this way, remittances allow 
the substitution of fixed exchange rate regimes by independent central banks as 
mechanisms of commitment to monetary discipline. 
It is possible that some remittance-recipient autocracies with independent central 
banks are still willing to adopt or maintain fixed exchange rates. We interpret these cases as 
situations that the literature frames as “fear of floating” (Calvo & Reinhart, 2002; Levy-
Yeyati & Sturzenegger, 2005), which may respond to domestic pressures, in the case of 
democracies, or to very serious credibility issues, in the case of autocracies.  
Finally, note that our analysis looks at how levels of remittances interact with 
political regimes and monetary institutions to affect the probability of observing different 
exchange rate regimes. A next step in this research agenda will explore how changes in 
remittances may equally affect the choices of exchange rate regimes. While our argument 
has so far rested on the well-documented stable and anti-cyclical character of remittances, 
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changes in economic conditions in destination countries may trigger a fall in remittances 
sent back home. We consider that exploring these dynamic effects will also imply giving 
serious attention to the role of central bank independence as a mediating factor in the 
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